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SUMMARY  |
Financial debt associated with legal system involvement is a pressing issue that 
affects the criminal justice system, offenders, and taxpayers. Mere contact with 
the criminal justice system often results in fees and fines that increase with 
progression through the system. Criminal justice fines and fees punish offenders 
and are designed to generate revenue for legal systems that are operating on 
limited budgets. However, fines and fees often fail to accomplish this second goal 
because many offenders are too poor to pay them. To compound their financial 
struggles, offenders may be subject to other financial obligations, such as child 
support payments and restitution requirements. If they do not pay their financial 
obligations, they may be subject to late fees and interest requirements, all of 
which accumulate into massive debt over time. Even if they want to pay, offenders 
have limited prospects for meaningful employment and face wage disparities 
resulting from their criminal history, which makes it even more difficult to pay 
off their debt. An inability to pay off financial debt increases the possibility that 
offenders will commit new offenses and return to the criminal justice system. 
Some courts re-incarcerate offenders simply because they are unable to settle 
their financial obligations. Imposing financial obligations and monetary penalties 
on offenders – a group that is overwhelmingly indigent – is not tenable. States 
often expend more resources attempting to recoup outstanding debt from 
offenders than they are able to collect from those who pay. This report explores 
the causes and effects of perpetual criminal debt and offers solutions for 
encouraging ex-offender payment.
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INTROdUCTION  |
The criminal justice system saddles offenders with financial obligations at 
nearly every stage of the legal process. Two primary justifications underlie 
these obligations: punishment and revenue generation. Legal systems impose 
fines, fees, and restitution requirements as a punitive measure intended to 
deter offenders from future crime. In addition to their punitive value, financial 
obligations are intended to generate revenue for criminal justice systems. Few 
would argue against funding at least a part of the criminal justice system by 
charging offenders. However, the majority of offenders are indigent unable 
to pay (Patel and Philip 2012). If they do not pay, they face perpetual late 
fees, high interest penalties, bad credit, mounting debt and the possibility of 
re-incarceration, all of which decrease the likelihood that offenders will ever be 
able to settle their legal debts. Paradoxically, criminal justice systems sometimes 
spend more on debt collection and punishing offenders who are behind on their 
payments than they are likely to recoup from enforcing the financial obligations 
of ex-offenders.
Offenders are subject to a number of criminal justice fees that multiply with 
deeper involvement in the criminal justice system. If there are victims, offenders 
may be responsible for restitution payments. If they have children, they will likely 
be required to pay child support. Nonpayment of these obligations has become 
a persistent problem despite aggressive attempts to collect outstanding debts. 
Most ex-offenders are poor. Many are unable to find meaningful employment or 
earn a steady and livable wage. Their financial struggles are compounded by laws 
that limit their eligibility to receive public assistance funds. Financial obligations 
overwhelmingly consign many ex-offenders to perpetual debt and poverty, 
increasing their likelihood of returning to the criminal justice system.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES
Depending on the jurisdiction, offenders are charged fees at nearly every phase 
of the criminal justice process. In addition to fines, interest, and penalties for 
late payments, offenders may be required to pay “user fees,” which differ from 
court-imposed fines. The sole purpose of user fees is to raise revenue for criminal 
justice systems, while court-imposed fines are intended to punish offenders or to 
provide financial compensation to victims (Bannon, Nagrecha and Diller 2010). 
Because many offenders are indigent and unable to afford payment, financial 
burdens can accumulate quickly. 
Legislators across the country have created numerous criminal fees and increased 
existing fees to offset the high costs of the legal system and incarceration. A 
Brennan Center study of the 15 states with the highest prison populations found 
that nearly all charge “poverty penalties,” which are added costs (e.g., late fees, 
interest, payment plan fees) imposed on individuals who cannot pay criminal 
debt all at once. Several states (e.g., California, Florida, Ohio, Texas) charge 
public defender fees, which could include a fee to apply for a public defender, 
fees for the cost of legal defense, and various administrative court fees (Bannon, 
Nagrecha and Diller 2010). Florida, for example, charges misdemeanor offenders 
$50 and felony offenders $100 for the cost of a public defender (Diller 2010). 
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Every state has a unique set of criminal fees, which could include fees for pre-trial 
detention, security in the courtroom, medical expenses during incarceration, 
community supervision, drug screens, treatment classes, transfer of community 
supervision to a different state, registration (for convicted sex offenders) and 
electronic monitoring (Levingston 2008; Bannon, Nagrecha and Diller 2010). 
Texas assesses a fee for “judicial fund court costs” ($15) as well as requiring 
offenders to pay a string of charges – an arrest fee ($5), a warrant fee ($50), and 
a time payment fee ($25) (Sunset Advisory Commission 2007). Washington State 
assesses an “insurance policy” fee of $15 per week for individuals sentenced 
to community service (Rosenthal and Weissman 2007). Since 1996, Florida has 
raised many of its existing fees by $10 to $50 and enacted 20 different fees for 
individuals ensnared in the criminal justice system (Diller 2010). These added fees 
include requirements that defendants pay for the costs of prosecution (minimum 
$50 charge), various surcharges that vary by offense type (a low of $15 for 
criminal traffic violations and a high of $151 for assault and battery convictions), 
and charges to inmates for subsistence costs while incarcerated (Diller 2010). 
 
Inmate Wages 
In 1934, Congress authorized the development of the Federal Prison Industries (FPI), a 
government corporation that uses inmate labor. Currently, approximately 20,000 physically-able 
inmates work for FPI to produce goods and services that are sold exclusively to government 
agencies and never reach commercial markets. FPI work programs generate revenue to fund 
the costs of incarceration and to enable inmates to pay restitution and child support obligations 
(Solomon, Johnson, Travis and McBride 2004). Inmate workers with financial obligations are 
required to pay at least 50 percent of their wages towards their debt (James 2008). FPI pays 
inmate workers between $0.23 and $1.15 per hour of work (James 2008). Currently, about 16 
percent of eligible inmates in federal prisons work in FPI factories (Federal Bureau of Prisons 
2013).
Common prison work assignments include institutional maintenance (janitorial work, laundry), 
industry jobs (furniture making, clothing and textile, printing, metal fabrication), and farm work 
(Solomon, Johnson, Travis and McBride 2004). Inmates who work while they are incarcerated 
earn approximately 90 percent less than minimum wage, making it difficult for them to save 
money and provide for their families. However, prison work does have benefits: it reduces idle 
time, enhances the development of vocational skills, and allows inmates to contribute some 
money to their legal debt and to their families at home (Atkinson and Rostad 2003). 
Inmate wages vary by state: 
• Massachusetts inmates earn approximately $1 per day of work
• Colorado pays inmates between $0.25 and $2.50 per work day
• California inmates receive between $0.30 and $0.95 per hour prior to deductions
• Kentucky compensates inmates between $0.25 to $0.95 per hour
• South Dakota inmates earn $0.25 per hour although some work assignments are unpaid
• Arkansas, Georgia and Texas do not pay inmates
 
Sources: Pearson (2004); California Prison Industry Authority (2011); Upton and Harp (2009); South Dakota 
department of Corrections (2013). 
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Some jurisdictions may have increased fees in response to citizen complaints 
regarding the amount of taxpayer money spent on incarcerating offenders. An 
Arizona sheriff proposed charging inmates $1 for every meal (Sign 2013). Officials 
in Anderson County, Tennessee proposed a plan to charge jail inmates for the 
cost of amenities while they are incarcerated. Inmates would have to pay for 
jail-issued pants ($9.15), blankets ($6.26) and toilet paper ($0.29) to defray these 
expenses (Rawlings 2013). Riverside County, California already requires financially 
solvent inmates to pay the full cost of their incarceration – $142 per day (St. John 
2011). A majority of these fees will likely become outstanding debt because they 
are imposed on indigent individuals who cannot afford payment (Shookhoff, 
Constantino and Elkin 2011).
Source: Bannon, Nagrecha and Diller (2010)
State Penalties
Florida Requires offenders to pay for the costs of prosecution irrespective of their ability 
to pay. 
[§ 938.27(2)(a)]
Michigan Courts can revoke probation or impose incarceration for those who fail to pay 
their debt.  
[Act 87 of 1985, 780.826]
Pennsylvania denies parole to offenders who are unable to pay a $60 fee.  
[18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 11.1101]
Virginia Many jurisdictions suspend the driver’s licenses of individuals who miss debt 
payments.  
[Va. Stat Ann. § 46.2-395(B)]
Alabama disenfranchises ex-offenders until they pay all of their criminal justice debt.  
[Ala. Code § 15-22-36.1(a)(3)]
California Charges ex-offenders $300 if they are unable to pay their fines.  
[Cal. Penal Code § 1214.1(A)]
Missouri Individuals can spend time in jail to settle their criminal justice debts. debtors 
are credited $10 for each day imprisoned.  
[Mo. Rev. Stat. § 543.270(1)]
North Carolina Charges at least $95 in general court fees, a $25 late payment fee, and a $20 
charge for paying in installments.  
[North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts, Court Costs and Fees Chart]
Examples of User Fees and Penalties for Non-Payment of Criminal Justice 
Debt by State  
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RESTITUTION
Restitution is one of the few mechanisms by which the criminal justice system 
seeks to acknowledge and address the direct impact of crime on victims. 
Courts require offenders subject to restitution obligations to provide financial 
compensation to victims for loss or damage to their property, lost income due to 
missing work, direct medical expenses, and psychological services, among other 
things (Reiss 2011). 
While restitution payments are an attempt to repair the harm inflicted upon 
victims, advocates assert they may also benefit offenders (Dickman 2009). 
Requiring offenders to pay restitution compels them to take responsibility 
for their offense and to participate actively in compensating their victim(s). 
Restitution may have rehabilitative effects as well, particularly for those who 
make consistent payments. There is an inverse correlation between paying 
restitution and recidivism, such that offenders who pay a high percentage of 
their restitution obligations have a lower likelihood of committing a new crime 
(Kempinen 2002). The same correlation was not found for payment of criminal 
fines, which suggests that paying restitution to victims has a more positive 
impact on offender rehabilitation than paying criminal fees to the state (Fetsco 
2012). 
Nevertheless, restitution debt is massive both at the individual and aggregate 
levels. This is particularly concerning because the majority of offenders lack 
the financial resources to pay their debts (Dickman 2009). Restitution usually 
comprises the largest proportion of criminal debt for individual offenders (Diller 
2010). In total, offenders in the United States owe more than $50 billion in 
criminal justice debt (National Center for Victims of Crime 2011), and in 2007, 
total restitution debt was nearly $40 billion (Dickman 2009). This suggests that 
a majority of uncollected criminal debt could be existing restitution obligations. 
Uncollected restitution debt means that victims may be left without financial 
compensation unless states provide other victim assistance funds.
Nonpayment of restitution obligations is inherently problematic. The Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act requires federal courts to order restitution without 
consideration of an offender’s capacity to pay (Dickman 2009). Despite 
the inability of most offenders to pay their restitution obligations, criminal 
justice officials must attempt to collect this debt. Most collection methods 
have not been effective (Ruback and Bergstrom 2006) and result in extensive 
administrative costs. Administrative costs increase substantially when offenders 
do not pay because officials must spend considerable time (and labor) to 
collect unpaid restitution (Dickman 2009). Additional problems with collecting 
restitution arise when an offender has multiple victims because there is no 
simple method for prioritizing restitution payments to each victim (Ruback and 
Bergstrom 2006). Despite the efforts of many jurisdictions to collect unpaid 
restitution, the majority of restitution payments remain uncollected (National 
Center for Victims of Crime 2011). 
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CHILd SUPPORT
Many offenders are non-custodial parents subject to child support obligations 
during and after their release from custody. In some states, child support 
debt continues to accumulate while the obligor (person who owes money) is 
incarcerated. Approximately 70 percent of incarcerated males between the ages 
of 33 and 40 are fathers (Western 2006), and the majority owe child support 
arrearages (debt) that they are unable to pay. The current amount of unpaid 
child support in the United States is around $100 billion (Patterson 2008). Laws 
regarding child support have become more punitive during the past few decades 
in response to rampant non-payment. However, many parents who owe child 
support are indigent and/or incarcerated and simply have no means to pay. When 
states do not have methods for modifying, suspending or forgiving arrearages 
for incarcerated parents, inmates accrue immense child support debt during and 
following their release from prison (Pearson and Griswold 2005). 
Noncustodial parents enter prison owing an average of more than $10,000 in 
child support debt (Pearson 2004). By the time they return to society from prison, 
noncustodial parents on parole owe thousands more in child support debt 
(Harris, Evans and Beckett 2010). If they serve their full sentences, they stand to 
accumulate approximately $20,000 in additional child support debt, between 
$4,000 and $5,000 in interest, and around $2,000 in penalty charges (Thoennes 
2002). The majority of these individuals are indigent and unable to pay their debt, 
which subjects them to further late penalties, interest charges, and continually 
increasing debt. Research indicates that fathers making less than $10,000 per year 
are responsible for 70 percent of all child support debt (Sorensen and Zibman 
2001). 
While some federal laws address child support payment, each state has its own 
guidelines for setting, collecting and modifying child support orders. Federal 
law forbids retroactive absolution of child support debt (Pearson 2004), which 
means that such debt will remain until it is paid. Also, federal guidelines (42 U.S.C. 
§ 659) allow jurisdictions to take up to 65 percent of a non-custodial parent’s 
salary to apply towards this debt (Public Counsel 2011). Some jurisdictions 
grant modifications in child support orders when changes in a parent’s situation 
damage their ability to pay. At least 21 states do not accept incarceration as a 
justification to reduce or eliminate child support debt because it is considered 
a foreseeable consequence of criminal action (Pearson 2004). Many states 
incarcerate parents for failure to pay child support orders (Brito 2012). Currently, 
national data on legal outcomes associated with nonpayment of child support 
debt do not exist because most jurisdictions do not track the number of arrests 
and incarcerations related to nonpayment (Solomon-Fears, Smith and Berry 
2012). 
Parents who do not pay child support are subject to a range of sanctions, none of 
which benefit their children. Child support agencies can garnish wages, withhold 
tax returns and social security benefits, suspend drivers licenses, deny passports, 
and encumber bank accounts to recover this debt (Anthony and Mellgren 2009). 
If obligors are financially solvent, these sanctions may not be problematic, but for 
individuals with limited income, such penalties may affect their ability to also pay 
rent and other obligations. If parents are unable to pay, child support obligations 
do not benefit children, the intended beneficiaries. Additionally, this failure to 
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provide financial support may strain the parent-child relationship. The possibility 
of incarceration for failure to pay child support may force indigent parents to 
flee, which not only negates the parent’s financial resources but removes parental 
support from the child’s life completely (Patterson 2008). 
There is no denying the importance of child support obligations. If parents refuse 
to provide financial support for their children, courts should have the authority to 
require them to make such payments. However, forcing an incarcerated or indigent 
parent to pay money that they do not have only worsens the situation and may 
saddle indigent individuals with perpetual debt. Child support debt is becoming 
unmanageable for many ex-offenders (Pearson and Griswold 2005).  A survey of 
released offenders found that child support assistance is the most common form 
of aid requested, higher than help finding a job or a place to live (Pearson and 
Griswold 2005).
dEBT PRIORITIES 
States have some discretion to prioritize offender debt payments. Federal law (42 
U.S.C. § 666), however, requires that child support obligations be given preference 
over all other debt (e.g., restitution, legal fees) (McLean and Thompson 2007). 
After child support, some states (e.g., Colorado, Georgia) prioritize legal fines 
and fees while other states (e.g., Florida, Michigan) prioritize the collection of 
restitution (McLean and Thompson 2007). On the federal level, the Code of Federal 
Regulations (28 CFR 545.11) outlines how payments should be prioritized (Legal 
Information Institute). The Code prioritizes Special Assessments imposed under 
18 U.S.C. 3013, which consist of fines that increase with the severity of the offense 
(Legal Information Institute). Court-ordered restitution receives next priority, 
followed by fines and court costs, state or local court obligations, and any other 
federal government obligations (Legal Information Center).
State Prioritization of Offender Obligations 
1. Child Support  
















Federal Prioritization of Offender Obligations 
1. Child Support
2. Special Assessments 
(18 U.S.C. 3013)
3. Court-Ordered Restitution
4. Fines and Court Costs




Sources: McLean and Thompson (2007); Legal Information Institute 
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dEBT COLLECTION 
An estimated 10 million people owe more than $50 billion in debt resulting 
from their involvement in the criminal justice system (Harris, Evans and Beckett 
2010; National Center for Victims of Crime 2011). Many offenders cannot afford 
payment and court-ordered financial obligations become detrimental to their 
reintegration. Criminal debt competes with other essential life expenses, such as 
food, rent, and child support (Shookhoff, Constantino and Elkin 2011). 
The reasons offenders do not pay criminal fees, restitution obligations, and child 
support arrearages include financial inability, lack of awareness of debt, and 
unwillingness to pay. The majority of offenders may never be able to pay off their 
criminal debt because they are poor both before and after their incarceration. 
Most offenders remain unemployed for at least a year following their release 
from prison (Patel and Philip 2012). Others may not pay their debts because they 
do not understand the sanctions, they disagree with the reasons behind their 
financial obligations, or they believe that the financial penalties were unfairly 
applied to them (Ruback, Hoskins, Cares and Feldmeyer 2006). 
The high prevalence of nonpayment creates problems for jurisdictions 
attempting to collect criminal fees and other financial obligations from offenders. 
Several jurisdictions have pursued aggressive methods of debt collection and 
punishments for nonpayment, which prolong existing financial burdens on 
offenders long after they are convicted or released from incarceration. Ironically, 
due to the amount of personnel hours and resources they require, the cost of 
debt collection efforts is usually higher than the money they generate. 
Common Collection Practices Hidden Costs 
Probation or parole officers monitor 
payments. 
Possible overtime costs and less time to devote to 
offender risks/needs. 
debtor must attend regular meetings with 
a judge, clerk, or collection official.
Possible overtime costs and burdened court dockets. 
Incarceration for failure to pay. Possible overtime for legal system personnel and 
incarceration costs. 
debt referred to private collection 
agencies.
debtor faces considerable collection fees and damage 
to credit.
driver’s license suspended for failure to 
pay.
Debtor has more obstacles to finding and maintaining 
employment.
Wage garnishment and tax rebate 
interception. 
debtor is deterred from seeking legitimate 
employment.
debt converted to a civil judgment. damage to debtor’s credit. 
Hidden Costs to the Legal System and Ex-Offenders Associated with Debt 
Collection Practices
Source: Bannon, Nagrecha and Diller (2010)
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Many states persistently pursue debtors because court operations budgets 
depend on this source of revenue (American Civil Liberties Union 2010). Officials 
in Washington State take a portion of wages from debtors or their spouses, and 
they also can confiscate bank assets, home equity, and tax refunds from debtors 
(Harris, Evans and Beckett 2010). County officials or collection agencies have the 
authority to charge late fees and interest to those who do not or cannot pay 
(Harris, Evans and Beckett 2010). Alabama imposes a 30 percent collection fee 
on debtors. Florida charges an additional 40 percent on top of debt owed for 
the cost of debt collection (Bannon, Nagrecha and Diller 2010). Interest rates 
on criminal fees are often as high as 12 percent. California can levy a 15 percent 
interest charge on debtors who are more than a month late on payments (Harris, 
Evans and Beckett 2010). When debt collection is not possible, jail time may 
become the only recourse for nonpayment.
Debt collection also places additional burdens on criminal justice employees. 
Probation and parole officers are often tasked with debt monitoring, collection 
and issuing punishments for failure to pay. These duties divert time from their 
essential functions of supervising ex-offenders and ensuring public safety (Patel 
and Philip 2012). 
The collection of restitution debt suffers from inefficiencies. Public and private 
collection agencies do not coordinate well, courts do not have a system to 
enforce the legal requirement to collect restitution payments, and many 
jurisdictions do not prioritize restitution collection (National Center for Victims 
of Crime 2011). Also, the majority of jurisdictions do not track the amount of 
restitution ordered or collected (National Center for Victims of Crime 2011), which 
makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of different collection methods. 
Some jurisdictions do not prioritize restitution payments and instead require 
that other financial obligations, such as fines and fees, be paid first, which leaves 
victims uncompensated for lengthy periods of time (Ruback and Bergstrom 2006). 
Child support debt collection is also problematic. After child support orders 
are established, it is difficult to keep track of obligors and ensure that they are 
making payments. This is of particular concern when obligors are incarcerated, 
as states do not have a method for identifying inmates with child support 
obligations and thus have no way to communicate with them (Pearson 2004). 
Even after their release from incarceration, the majority of child support arrears 
are uncollectable. Arrears that are more than a few years old are especially 
unlikely to be collected (Bartfeld 2003). Despite the low success rate of child 
support debt collection, many jurisdictions continue to pursue debtors and spend 
more on debt collection than they are able to collect (Pearson and Griswold 
2005). 
While criminal debt collection is costly, it is impossible to determine exactly how 
much is spent to collect these debts because most states do not have procedures 
for monitoring the costs of debt collection (Bannon, Nagrecha and Diller 2010). 
Ultimately, states are often able to collect only a small portion of the criminal 
debt that offenders owe. In Florida, for example, court officials routinely expect to 
collect only nine percent of fees associated with felony cases (Diller 2010). A study 
in North Carolina found that the costs of collection – law enforcement, courts, 
and jails – outweighed the amount collected from debtors (Bannon, Nagrecha 
and Diller 2010). Officials in Alabama collected $4 million in 2012, which was only 
a small percentage of the financial obligations owed by offenders (Lockette 2013). 
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EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL dEBT 
Former offenders with debt encounter a number of problems that interfere with 
successful reintegration. Debt reduces household income and limits their ability 
to attain housing, employment, and access to credit. It also hobbles existing 
credit, which makes it even more difficult to get a job, to receive approval 
to rent an apartment, and to apply for loans. Criminal debt also impedes an 
ex-offender’s prospects of attaining public health benefits, can result in a driver’s 
license suspension, and negates their ability to apply for a pardon or criminal 
record expungement in some states (Vallas and Patel 2012). It also increases the 
likelihood of continued involvement with the criminal justice system through 
extended probation or parole, re-arrest, or re-incarceration (Harris, Evans and 
Beckett 2010). Some states disenfranchise ex-offenders until they have paid off 
their debt entirely. For example, ex-offenders in Florida are required to fulfill their 
restitution obligations before they can restore their right to vote, serve jury duty, 
and obtain certain occupational licenses (Diller 2010). An important consequence 
of financial burdens is that they increase the likelihood of recidivism, particularly 
when offenders are unable to pay (Dickman 2009).  
A job can help ex-offenders generate income to pay their debts, but even 
with employment, they stand to lose much of their income to debt collectors. 
Based on their annual average, ex-offenders owe as much as 60 percent of their 
income to criminal debts (Harris, Evans and Beckett 2010). A study of ex-felons 
on probation in Texas found that they owed between $4,000 and $5,000 in 
obligations related to their offense (Reynolds et al. 2009). For ex-offenders who 
are unemployed or indigent, fines and interest that accrue over time gradually 
make this debt unmanageable. 
Debt financially and emotionally strains ex-offenders, which can negatively 
affect their psychological well-being (Shookhoff, Constantino and Elkin 2011). 
Some offenders saddled with debt have expressed feelings of anxiety, anger and 
hopelessness (Martire, Sunjic, Topp and Indig 2011). Those who experience these 
psychological symptoms are more likely to abscond in order to avoid payment 
(Harris, Evans and Beckett 2010). 
The worst-case scenario for offenders who cannot pay their debt is 
re-incarceration. Some jurisdictions (e.g., California, Missouri) allow individuals 
who have outstanding criminal debt to spend time in jail in lieu of paying off 
their debt (Bannon, Nagrecha and Diller 2010). This practice creates what critics 
call the new “debtors’ prisons” (American Civil Liberties Union 2010). Despite 
its occurrence, however, incarcerating an individual for being too poor to pay 
criminal debt is not constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court ruled in 
Bearden v. Georgia (1983) that failure to pay criminal debt is not grounds for 
incarceration if an individual lives in poverty (American Civil Liberties Union 2010). 
The Supreme Court determined in its ruling that only “willful” nonpayment may 
result in incarceration (Harris, Evans and Beckett 2010). 
Jurisdictions in several states continue to incarcerate individuals if they do not 
pay their debt, regardless of their financial insolvency. In Rhode Island, failure to 
pay court debt was the most common reason that individuals were incarcerated 
between 2005 and 2007. The average amount owed was $826 and the average 
cost of three days of incarceration was $505 (Rhode Island Family Life Center 
2008). 
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Sources of Offender Debt, Consequences of Non-Payment, and How to Reduce Debt
Fees charged to 
offenders by the court, 
levied with a punitive 
purpose.
A court ordered penalty 




to provide financial 
compensation to 
biological child.
Levied with a public cost 
recovery purpose (e.g., 




















Wage growth for 
ex-offenders is 
30% lower than 
equally qualified 
non-offenders. 
      Barrier 
Ex-offenders 
have limited to no 
access to financial 




Court Fees/Fines Restitution Child Support Other Fees
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EMPLOYMENT WAGES 
While employment barriers are a concern for ex-offenders, the quality of 
jobs available to them is equally problematic. Incarceration makes it difficult 
for ex-offenders to attain quality jobs for several reasons. First, incarceration 
stigmatizes ex-offenders and reduces the likelihood that an employer will hire 
them. Second, the lack of access to job training in prison and time out of the 
job market with its changing technologies erode offenders’ job skills. Finally, 
incarceration erodes inmates’ existing social networks that could have helped 
them attain quality jobs. Together, the stigma of a criminal conviction, lack of 
training and experience, and loss of social networks during incarceration can have 
negative impacts on an ex-offender’s employment opportunities upon release 
(Pettit and Lyons 2009). The jobs that ex-offenders can attain often lack security 
and do not provide much capacity for higher earnings over time.
Wage inequality is a near certain consequence of incarceration. Because those 
who have served time in prison have less access to steady jobs that provide 
sufficient income, incarceration reduces the wages that ex-offenders earn by 
10 to 20 percent (Western 2002). Incarceration also negatively impacts wage 
mobility, which is the change in earned income over time. Offenders who have 
been incarcerated experience a slower growth in their wages over time than 
individuals without a history of incarceration; serving time in prison reduces the 
rate of wage growth by 30 percent (Western 2002).
This problem is compounded for minority offenders. Studies have shown that 
Black and Latino offenders usually earn lower wages than White offenders 
(Johnson and Johnson 2012). Additionally, an examination of the quarterly 
earnings of ex-offenders who were recently released from prison in Washington 
State found that the wages of Black offenders increased at a considerably slower 
rate than the wages of White offenders (Lyons and Pettit 2011). Even after 
controlling for additional factors, such as education, age, and work history, Black 
offenders still earned 10 percent less than White offenders (Lyons and Pettit 
2011).
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR Ex-OFFENdERS
Despite living on minimal income and facing substantial financial obligations, 
offenders often face barriers to obtaining state and federal financial assistance. 
Currently, between 13 and 18 million individuals in the United States are unable 
to receive public benefits because of their criminal history (Lucken and Ponte 
2008). For instance, convicted sex offenders are prohibited from receiving 
government housing subsidies (Oyama 2009). Convicted drug offenders may 
be denied Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), food stamps, 
and postsecondary education aid, including Pell Grants, Stafford loans, and 
work-study assistance (United States Government Accountability Office 2005). 
While food stamps are intended to provide individuals and families living in 
poverty with financial assistance to purchase food, federal legislation has limited 
the ability of convicted offenders to receive food stamps (Pearson 2004). The 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 banned individuals 
with a felony drug conviction from receiving TANF and food stamps from the 
federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (The Sentencing 
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Project 2013). States may modify or opt out of this ban, and many have done 
so, but the ban is estimated to have stripped more than 180,000 people of food 
stamp eligibility (The Sentencing Project 2013). Food stamps represent valuable 
financial aid that can ease part of an ex-offender’s living costs and permit 
them to allot their financial resources towards other obligations and debts. 
Removing food stamp benefits from convicted offenders strains their existing 
financial resources, increases their risk of malnutrition, and increases their risk 
of recidivism. The health and re-incarceration costs of denying food stamps to 
convicted drug offenders may be higher than providing them with food stamps in 
the first place. 
Individuals with a criminal conviction may lose their eligibility for financial aid to 
attain higher education. A conviction for a drug offense results in an outright ban 
on financial aid for those who were convicted of the drug offense while they were 
receiving financial aid (Legal Action Center 2012). Students are disqualified from 
receiving educational benefits for varying periods of time if they are convicted 
of certain drug offenses (United States Government Accountability Office 2005). 
The first conviction for possession of a controlled substance can result in an 
individual losing his or her financial aid for one year, and the first conviction for 
sale of a controlled substance can result in two years of ineligibility. Subsequent 
convictions can lead to indefinite ineligibility (Mukamal and Samuels 2002). 
Convicted drug offenders can restore their postsecondary education benefits if 
they successfully complete a drug treatment program and pass unannounced 
drug tests (United States Government Accountability Office 2005).
State Responses to the Ban on Federal Welfare Benefits for Convicted Drug 
Offenders (2011)
States that have modified (eased) the ban
States that have eliminated the ban
States fully enforcing the ban
Source: The Sentencing Project (2013)
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Government subsidized housing is sometimes denied to convicted offenders. 
Local Public Housing Authority (PHA) offices can deny public housing assistance to 
applicants who were previously evicted from a federally funded housing project due 
to drug use or sale (Prison Law Office 2011). PHA’s have the discretion to consider 
the arrest records of applicants when determining eligibility for public housing, 
even if the arrest did not result in a conviction. One study found that more than 
half the housing authority decisions regarding public housing eligibility are based 
on arrests that never led to a conviction (Legal Action Center 2004). Individuals 
convicted of sexual and drug offenses encounter the greatest housing restrictions 
(Morani, Wikoff, Linhorst and Bratton 2011). Convicted sex offenders are prohibited 
from receiving government housing subsidies completely (Oyama 2009), while 
convicted drug offenders subject to federal housing restrictions could lose housing 
benefits from three years to life (United States Government Accountability Office 
2005).
Some states provide offenders with a small sum of money upon their release from 
prison. Called “release funds” or “gate money,” these are intended for ex-offenders 
to buy food, clothes or a bus ticket (Prison Law Office 2011). In Illinois, for example, 
ex-offenders receive $50 in addition to a new outfit and a bus ticket when they 
are released (Visher and Travis 2003). According to California Penal Code § 2713.1, 
the state is to provide ex-offenders with $200 when they are released from an 
incarceration facility. Some ex-offenders receive only half of this money initially, 
but they must receive the entire payment within 60 days of their release (Prison 
Law Office 2011). However, across all states, average release funds amount to only 
$53, which does not cover a full day of living expenses if the ex-offender needs 
temporary lodging (Rukus and Lane 2013).
Financial obligations resulting from criminal involvement are intended to generate 
money for criminal justice systems and to punish offenders. However, because 
the majority of ex-offenders responsible for these obligations are indigent 
and unable to pay (Patel and Philip 2012), financial requirements become a 
perpetual punishment, exacerbating poverty and economic inequality (Harris, 
Evans and Beckett 2010). Offenders who owe money become ensnared in debt 
without means for resolving it. If they cannot pay, they face mounting fees and 
possible incarceration for nonpayment. The threat of re-incarceration leads some 
ex-offenders to abscond. The system of financial obligations for offenders will never 
be profitable for the state. Rather, it will only serve to expand and prolong criminal 
punishment for ex-offenders already facing multiple barriers to reintegration, 
including possible unemployment, lesser income and job stability, and ineligibility 
for many forms of public financial assistance.













Idaho $0 No gate money. Funds provided for housing/treatment directly to 
provider.
Kansas $100 Offenders with multiple offenses receive $40. Average distribution 
to inmates is $50 or less. 
Kentucky $50 $50 at warden’s discretion if inmate is indigent. 
Louisiana $10 distributions to inmates range between $10 and $100.
Maine $50 Receipt of gate money is contingent on good behavior.
Maryland $50 $50 gate money comes from a reserve account set up for 
inmates.
Massachusetts $50 $50 paid to indigent inmates.
Mississippi $25 Gate money is based on time served.
Missouri $0
Montana $100 Additional funds are available for those serving longer than three 
years.




New Mexico $50 State supplements account for up to $50 of gate money, but there 
are deductions from inmates placed into a release program.
North Carolina $45 Inmates only receive funds if they were incarcerated for 24 
months or more.
Ohio $75
Rhode Island $20 State supplements account for up to $20 of gate money. 
South Carolina $0
Vermont $200 Distribution of gate money is based on inmate financial need.
Virginia $25
Washington $40
Wisconsin $0 deductions from inmate pay provide funds for inmates on work 
release. Funds are contingent on employment, so assumed gate 
money is $0.
Release Funds in Selected States 
Source: Rukus and Lane (2013)
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PROPOSEd SOLUTIONS  |
Although most offenders have debt resulting from their criminal justice 
involvement and many will never be able to pay it off in full, by addressing 
some inherent problems, criminal justice systems can increase the likelihood of 
payment while lessening the financial burden on offenders. 
BANKRUPTCY REFORM 
Individuals who are unable to repay their debts to creditors may have to file 
for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is a stigmatized condition that allows the debtor to 
abrogate their rightful obligations of payment (Stiglitz 2001). There is no optimal 
bankruptcy code that benefits all debtors. While a legal declaration of bankruptcy 
may be necessary for some debtors, it has negative consequences for many of 
their creditors, which can include the state (criminal fees), the victims (restitution), 
and the debtor’s dependents (child support). Today’s legal methods for handling 
the debts of indigent ex-offenders creates problems for both debtors and 
creditors.
Bankruptcy is beneficial when it results in a quick discharge of a debtor’s 
legal debts, although they do have to surrender their non-exempt property. 
However, this could leave a large group of debtors, particularly those with 
minimal financial resources, unable to ever have positive net worth, to plan for 
retirement or sickness, or to own property. Criminal debt makes it difficult for 
many ex-offenders to attend school and obtain housing. Regional and racial 
variation in debt discharge imposes a disproportionate burden on communities 
as a result of criminal justice system involvement (Lawless 2010). Bankruptcy laws 
should be changed to reduce perpetual criminal debts, which act as a barrier to 
reintegration.
FEE AMOUNTS
Many courts set fee amounts without taking into account an offender’s financial 
viability, income, or employment status. Although courts should consider the 
nature and impact of an offense when establishing fee amounts, it may be more 
important for them to ascertain an offender’s financial status. In Florida, state 
law requires payment plans to be tailored to an offender’s income and ability to 
pay, though courts do not always follow this law (Diller 2010). Tailoring payment 
schedules to offenders’ finances could lessen the rate of debt accumulation 
and increase payment consistency. Even if offenders are only able to pay a few 
dollars a month on a payment schedule, prioritizing consistency over amount will 
likely generate more payment than the current system. In order to accomplish 
this, courts need access to offenders’ financial records and must receive 
regular notifications about any changes in employment status so that financial 
obligations and payment schedules can be adjusted accordingly. 
Financial obligations in the criminal justice system are further complicated 
because they primarily affect those who are least able to afford payment. The 
majority of people who enter the criminal justice system are poor, and fines and 
fees at nearly every phase of the criminal justice process severely strain their 
meager finances. Some of these fees should be removed. It is unreasonable for 
courts to hold indigent defendants liable for public defender fees. In Gideon 
RESEARCH & EVALUATION CENTERJOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE / CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 16PAGE
v. Wainwright (1963), the Supreme Court affirmed that individuals who cannot 
afford legal representation are entitled to a court-appointed legal defense. 
This ruling should preclude any attempt to charge poor defendants for legal 
representation. These charges dissuade some offenders from exercising their 
right to legal counsel, which could result in wrongful convictions (Bannon, 
Nagrecha and Diller 2010). Georgia has a law that requires courts to waive public 
defender fees if a defendant cannot afford payment, but many defendants have 
no opportunity to demonstrate indigence and ultimately waive their right to legal 
representation (American Civil Liberties Union 2010). A federal court recently 
found two cities in Washington State liable for failing to provide adequate 
representation for indigent defendants (American Civil Liberties Union 2013). 
This ruling has implications for jurisdictions with underfunded indigent defense 
systems. In addition to removing public defender fees, states should reduce or 
waive other financial penalties for individuals living in poverty, including late fees, 
collection fees, payment plan fees and high interest charges (Bannon, Nagrecha 
and Diller 2010). 
PRIORITIzATION OF FEES
Although federal law prioritizes child support payments, states should follow 
the model of Arizona, Florida, Michigan and others that also prioritize restitution 
payment over legal fees and court-ordered fines. Restitution payment not 
only benefits victims but enables offenders to know where and to whom their 
payments are going. The payment of criminal fees and fines only benefits criminal 
justice systems, which may discourage offenders from paying them. Restitution 
and child support directly benefits victims and children. If offenders are aware 
of how much of their payment benefits the victim(s) of their crime, there may 
be psychological benefits that increase their likelihood of continued payment 
(Ruback and Bergstrom 2006). 
TRACKING dEBT
States often lack systems for tracking aggregate criminal debt and expenditures 
on debt collection, so it is impossible to calculate the amount of outstanding 
criminal debt and the costs of enforcing debt collection. It takes considerable 
time for probation and parole officers, clerks, judges, attorneys, and law 
enforcement to collect debt, so a portion of their salary should be included in 
the debt collection. It appears that states spend more to collect debt than they 
recoup from debtors (Bannon, Nagrecha and Diller 2010), but it is impossible to 
know the exact amount of this deficit. States officials should create a system for 
tracking debt collection expenditures to assess their cost-benefit. 
IMPROVING RESTITUTION COLLECTION
The system of restitution collection should be reformed. Victims should be able 
to play an active role in their pursuit of restitution. To this end, the legal system 
should educate and empower victims and provide them with the resources and 
legal support necessary to seek restitution payments from their offenders (Fetsco 
2012). In Arizona, law enforcement informs victims of their rights and allows 
victims the opportunity to exercise or waive those rights (National Center for 
Victims of Crime 2011). If a court finds that a defendant willfully defaulted from 
restitution payment, state constitutional provisions allow the court to garnish the 
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defendant’s wages or to incarcerate him or her (National Center for Victims of 
Crime 2011). State officials should target and enforce the collection of restitution 
debt when individuals are financially able to pay (Dickman 2009). States also 
should create uniform policies for collecting restitution and informing debtors 
about the status of their restitution debt through letters and notices (National 
Center for Victims of Crime 2011). 
IMPROVING CHILd SUPPORT COLLECTION
It makes little sense to require offenders who are non-custodial parents to pay 
money that they do not have, so courts should adjust unrealistic child support 
debts accordingly. Maryland has created the Child Support Payment Incentive 
Program, which offers incentives for those who comply with child support 
obligations. Non-custodial and low income parents who make consistent child 
support payments for one year can reduce their child support debt by 50 percent; 
those who make consistent payments for two years can have their debt absolved 
completely (Klempin and Mincy 2009). Maryland also suspends child support 
orders for indigent parents who are incarcerated for more than 18 months 
(Warnock Foundation 2013). 
Several states have adopted mechanisms to ease the burden on indigent 
or incarcerated parents. These policies are effective because they require 
accountability but offer incentives for compliance.  Courts in Minnesota can 
retroactively modify child support orders if a parent lacks financial means and 
is incarcerated for any reason other than nonpayment (Pearson 2004). Arizona 
passed legislation to allow non-custodial parents to petition the court to suspend 
interest on child support arrears while they are incarcerated (Pearson 2004). Only 
the debtor can make requests for child support modifications, however, which 
is difficult if he or she is incarcerated. Caseworkers should be available to assist 
incarcerated people with the process of requesting reviews and modifications of 
child support orders, as some states currently do (Anthony and Mellgren 2009). 
Iowa operates a program that forgives a percentage of arrearages following 
several months of consistent payment; the longer they are able to make 
payments on time, the greater the proportion of their debt that can be legally 
forgiven (Bartfeld 2003). Counties in Wisconsin forgive interest requirements for 
debtors that make consistent payments (Bartfeld 2003). 
Information and resources could encourage offenders both during and following 
their incarceration to pay their child support debt. Four states – Oregon, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Washington – offer information sessions to newly 
processed inmates to inform them how to request a review and modification 
of child support orders (Pearson 2004). Video sessions save on these costs 
because they preclude a state employee from having to be present. Agencies 
in Washington State, including Child Support Enforcement, the Department 
of Corrections, and Corrections Clearinghouse, a reentry program, work with 
ex-offenders to develop payment plans and modify arrears to match their ability 
to pay (Pearson 2004). Educating and providing reentry assistance to those 
with child support debt can improve the collection of child support payments 
and reduce the burden on obligors to a manageable, payable level. Also, courts 
should have more discretion to set and modify child support orders, which would 
enable them to consider changes in the financial circumstances of debtors. 
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PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
Prohibitions on public assistance for certain categories of convicted offenders 
make sense when public safety is at stake. However, ex-offenders should be 
able to earn back their eligibility for food stamps, educational aid, and housing 
subsidies if they demonstrate reform and do not commit additional offenses for 
some duration of time that varies in proportion to the severity of their offense. 
Denying otherwise eligible ex-offenders access to public assistance keeps them 
in poverty (Eadler 2011), while enabling ex-offenders’ access to social services 
enhances their reintegration and reduces their likelihood of recidivism (Visher 
and Travis 2003). For example, cost-benefit analyses indicate that removing the 
food stamp ban for certain drug offenders would decrease recidivism and yield 
considerable savings for individuals who are not re-incarcerated (Eadler 2011).
ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION
Instead of incarceration for nonpayment, work assistance programs should 
provide opportunities for ex-offenders to work on community service projects at 
a real wage and pay off their debt through a portion of the income they generate. 
Incarceration should not be an option for offenders who are without financial 
means to settle their financial obligations. States should only allow incarceration 
or extend parole or probation sentences for individuals who are financially solvent 
but refuse to pay their debts (Patel and Philip 2012). 
Although some ex-offenders are able to pay their criminal debt, many lack 
the income and the social support necessary to achieve financial stability. 
Ex-offenders are often uneducated (Guerrero 2010). It is difficult to find a steady 
job without a GED or high school diploma and with incarceration-related gaps 
in one’s work history. More attention to employment needs and social support 
would increase the ability of ex-offenders to pay their debt. Ex-offenders who are 
employed, have ties to their community, are allowed to make payments over time, 
and are informed about the importance of restitution are most likely to make 
payments (Ruback and Bergstrom 2006). Policies should address these issues.
RESEARCH & EVALUATION CENTERJOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE / CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 19PAGE
CONCLUSION  |
Contact with the criminal justice system may lead to severe financial 
consequences for offenders. Even after completing court-imposed punishments, 
they may have difficulty finding employment, and if they do manage to get a job, 
their criminal history negatively affects the quality of the job, their job security, 
and their wage growth. Offenders are also subject to a number of criminal fees, 
fines, and restitution. If they have children, the legal system can require offenders 
to pay child support, which compounds during incarceration. Because many 
ex-offenders lose their eligibility to receive public assistance funds, financial 
obligations resulting from criminal justice system involvement exacerbate every 
financial expense in their lives, from food and rent to medical and educational 
costs. 
There are hidden costs to saddling offenders with large amounts of debt. The 
majority of offenders who enter the criminal justice system are indigent and 
unable to pay their financial obligations, so many rack up endless debt (Patel and 
Philip 2012). When ex-offenders are unable to pay, interest can accumulate and 
create a debt so large that it is meaningless because they will never be able to 
pay it off. Offenders in some jurisdictions are subject to re-incarceration for failure 
to pay their financial obligations. The creation of these new “debtors’ prisons” 
are antithetical to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that individuals cannot be 
incarcerated for indigence. 
The purpose of criminal fees and fines is to generate funds for the criminal justice 
system and to restore the harms caused by crime. In most cases, these goals 
are not being met. Some states allocate more resources to collect debt than 
they garner from debtors (Bannon, Nagrecha and Diller 2010). To improve this 
system, criminal justice personnel should collect information on debt burdens to 
determine appropriate fees for ex-offenders based on their ability to pay. 
Former offenders living in poverty may never be able to fully settle their financial 
obligations. Debt reduction incentives for even minimal payments would help 
generate some funds and alleviate the constant accrual of debt. Policies should 
also prioritize restitution obligations that benefit victims over those that benefit 
the criminal justice system (criminal fines). Unreasonable financial obligations 
perpetually punish many ex-offenders and consign them to a life of permanent 
debt and poverty – the ultimate debt penalty. While obligations like child support 
and restitution are legitimate, it makes better sense to enable and incentivize 
achievable payments than to compound crushing debts beyond any hope of 
payment.
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